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Safety practice
Tyre recycling utilising molten metal -  risk 
assessment of a laboratory scale investigation
Maria Sousa-Gallagher1, Frank Riedewald2, Paul Conway1
1 School o f Engineering, University College Cork, Ireland
2 Chem. Eng. Technik Ltd, Cork, Ireland
Summary
This paper describes the process undertaken prior to 
the commencement of a proposed tyre laboratory scale 
experiment carried out in University College Cork, Ireland 
to identify the hazards, assess the risks, change the design 
and implement control measures to manage the hazards of 
the experiment.
Keywords: Laboratory, risk assessment, pyrolysis, tyres
Introduction
In the European Union as in many other countries, 
employers are legally obliged to carry out risk assessments 
on occupational health and safety (OH&S)1. This legal 
requirement is, of course, also valid for experiments at 
tertiary institutions. While it is not unusual for universities 
to do experimental work, it can be dangerous2-4. This may 
also be true for a proposed tyre laboratory scale experiment, 
which was carried out in University College Cork, Ireland, as 
it involved molten metal, flammable gases, flammable solids 
and nitrogen at temperatures of about 450 °C presenting 
potentially significant physical hazards such as fire, explosion 
and splashes of molten metal. This paper describes how we 
identified the hazards, assessed the risks, changed the design 
and implemented control measures to manage OH&S hazards 
of this laboratory scale experiment.
Pyrolysis is a promising technology to recycle tyres, as 
it is capable of recovering the raw materials of tyres. This 
process uses heat in the absence of oxygen to break the 
tyres down into pyrolysis oil, gases, carbon black and steel. 
The amounts and composition of pyrolysis oil, gas and 
carbon black produced are well known5'10 although the exact 
influence of the various operating parameters on the pyrolysis 
of tyres is still subject to debate as is discussed in three 
recent reviews8'10. Because the chemistry of tyre pyrolysis 
is well established5'10, the tyre laboratory experiment is 
only concerned with the physical separation of the various 
products (carbon black, steel, vapours) whereas the amounts 
and composition of the pyrolysis oil and the non-condensable 
gases are not further investigated. Although tyre pyrolysis 
is seen as a promising technology, full scale plants have 
been plagued by being uneconomical. The experiment
was designed to verify the concept of a new approach to 
tyre pyrolysis11, which would treat whole tyres rather than 
granulated ones, resulting in potentially substantial energy and 
capital costs savings.
As will be outlined, the risk of an accident during the 
laboratory experiment i.e. afire, injury or worse is negligible, 
as all reasonable hazards have been identified and preventive 
measures have been taken. In addition, mitigation measures 
have been identified, reducing the consequences of an 
accident. Figurel gives an image of the experimental setup 
taken before the heat was applied.
Description of the laboratory scale process
A drawing of the laboratory scale tyre pyrolysis process is 
presented in Figure 2. The pyrolysis chamber (Figure 2, 2) is 
manufactured from 6" and 4" ANSI schedule 40 (6" pipe = 7.1 
mm wall thickness, 4" pipe = 6.02 mm wall thickness), 316L 
stainless steel pipes with a 7 mm 316L stainless steel plate 
welded onto these pipes as the bottom plate. The bottom 
of the chamber has a slope of 45 degrees. Both legs of the 
pyrolysis chamber can be opened; leg A by unbolting the 
schedule 40 flange which ensures that the chamber is airtight, 
whereas leg B is essentially open to the atmosphere as only
—  Fume hood
— -Condenser (12)
— Reactor (44)
—  Nitrogen supply (29)
—  Blow torches
— Containment bund
Aluminium foil 
protecting floor 
and fume hood
Figure 7: Photo o f the experimental setup (refer to the text and 
Figure 2 for identification o f numbers).
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a cover to avoid excess heat loss is provided. The pyrolysis 
gases are condensed by condenser (Figure 2,12) with cooling 
water and collected in a glass beaker (Figure 2, 43). During 
the pyrolysis experiments, the formation of an explosive 
atmosphere within the pyrolysis chamber and downstream 
equipment is prevented by nitrogen inerting the whole system 
in addition to providing a small nitrogen sweep through the 
chamber.
The design of the experiment evolved over a number of 
iterations with the input from various parties i.e. technicians 
from the department, the manufacturer of the vessels and 
others, with the result that some hazards were eliminated from 
the experiment (see Figure 3). For example an earlier design 
included a charging lock (Figure 2, 27) for tyre pieces allowing 
adding of materials to the pyrolysis chamber (Figure 2, 2) 
while at operating temperature. This arrangement, however, 
made the experiment top heavy as the valves are very heavy 
designed to operate at 4502C with the risk of topplingthe 
experiment over.
Moreover, unnecessary complexity was removed from 
the experiment. The original design also included a fan and 
a cyclone. The cyclone was installed to remove carbon black 
entrained in the vapour stream originating from the pyrolysis 
chamber (Figure 2, 3) or leg A. In orderto ensure proper 
functioning of the cyclone, a fan and large amounts of nitrogen 
would have been required. Flowever removing carbon black 
from vapour streams with cyclones or bag filters is state-of-the- 
art and hence proof of this operation is not necessary11.
Risk assessment
The actual risk assessment procedure used followed a 
procedure from the University of South Wales12 and the HSE13.
According to these two documents, risks must be minimised to 
the lowest reasonably practicable level by taking measures in 
the following order.
1. Elimination
Eliminate the hazard: performed as described above.
2. Substitution
Replace the material or process with a less hazardous one: 
not possible as the materials are essential to the experiment
3. Engineering controls
Install or use additional machinery such as local exhaust 
ventilation to control the risk: the exhaust from the 
experiment shall be vented into a laboratory fume hood 
cabinet.
4. Administrative controls
Reduce the time the experimenter(s) is exposed to the 
hazard. Perform risk assessments.
5. Personal Protective Equipment
Only after all the previous measures have been tried 
and found to be ineffective in controlling the risks to a 
reasonably practicable level, then Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) must be used. Flowever as this will be the 
first time this experiment is carried out, PPE will be worn 
regardless of any risk assessments.
In effect, a combination of elimination, engineering controls, 
administrative controls arid PPE was chosen to control the risks 
of this experiment.
Two different experiments are planned to be carried out on the 
laboratory scale pyrolysis plant:
Experiment 1: Steel separation with leg A open to the
atmosphere; flange (Figure 2, 44) removed, 
condenser (Figure 2,12) and pyrolysis oil 
collecting pot (Figure 2, 43) are not used. 
Experiment 2: Rubber pyrolysis with leg A closed, airtight 
and nitrogen inerted; condenser 
(Figure 2,12) and pyrolysis oil collecting pot 
(Figure 2, 43) are used.
The hazards associated with molten metal were identified 
from relevant European standards15'16, literature17 and own 
assessment after a site visit.
In the next section, the potential hazards of the steel 
separation experiment are assessed, and the additional hazards 
of the rubber pyrolysis experiment are assessed following that.
Experiment 7: Steel separation risk assessment
During the steel separation experiments, leg A is open to 
the atmosphere (flange (Figure 2, 44) is removed). Once the 
operating temperature of 450 aC has been reached, small steel 
parts will be introduced into leg A to verify that they migrate by 
gravity from leg A to leg B.
The actual risk assessment of experiment 1 is presented 
below in tabulated form following the procedure from the 
University of South Wales13:
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No Hazard Consequence Preventive measures Mitigation measures
7. Accidental 
introduction or 
accidental spillage o f 
liquids in or onto the 
molten zinc.
Ejection of molten metal 
from evolution o f steam 
or gases.
Generation of hot gases 
and steam.
Only dry steel parts are introduced into the chamber.
The exposed surface area of the molten metal is small, 
minimising the possibility of accidentally introducing liquids into 
the chamber.
Fire extinguishers suitable for molten 
metal are provided.
Drinking or eating is not allowed in 
the laboratory.
PPE suitable for molten metal /  hot 
gases and steam is worn.
Protect area with aluminium foil from 
possible ejection of molten metal.
2. Increased pressure 
in leg A o f vessel.
Overflow or spillage of 
molten metal.
Not possible as leg A is open to the atmosphere during 
experiment 1.
The containment bund can take 
more than 150% of the entire amount 
of the molten metal.
3. Breakages o f bath 
container i.e. weld 
by thermal stresses, 
corrosion or both.
Leakage of molten zinc 
through holes.
Very unlikely as the vessel is constructed from a Schedule 40 
pipe, 316LSS (minimum wall thickness 6.02 mm).
All welds wetted with molten zinc are fully penetrated.
Heat up and cool down the containment vessel slowly.
The container of the experiment will be exposed to molten 
zinc for less than 4 hours limiting corrosion. To put corrosion 
of 316LSS by molten zinc into perspective: A container 
manufactured from 25 mm thick 316 LSS is suitable for about 
8 years o f continuous operation in industrial scale hot dip 
galvanising plants operating at about 450 °C ” . However at 
higher operating temperatures the lifespan will be reduced 
below 8 years18.
The containment bund can take 
more than 150% of the entire amount 
of the molten metal.
The molten metal will rapidly 
solidify on contact with the metal 
containment bund, as the zinc melt 
temperature of 419SC is close to the 
operating temperature of 450QC.
The amount of molten metal is as 
small as possible (less than 2 litre).
4. Overheating o f zinc. Excessive corrosion of 
the container material 
(316 LSS) by the molten 
zinc potentially resulting 
in leakage.
Thermal stresses in 
container metal of 
construction resulting in 
leaks i.e. weld breakage.
The molten zinc temperature is measured by a temperature 
gauge as the experiment demands that the operating 
temperature is controlled to 450 °C.
Container is over-designed for the duty (schedule 40 pipe). All 
welds are fully penetrated.
As the time frame of the experiment is limited even a 
temperature overrun of 100 5C would not be a problem.
The experiment is supervised at 
all times. The temperature will be 
closely monitored and if necessary 
the burners will be adjusted to avoid 
any temperature overrun.
Inhalation o f zinc fumes. 
Metal fume fever caused 
by ZnO.
Despite the high operating temperatures of 450 °C, zinc and
zinc oxide (ZnO) fumes are either negligible or non-existent:
a) The zinc fume concentration in the working environment is 
low as the zinc vapour pressure is very low at 450 °C (see 
Appendix).
b) The zinc fume concentration in the working environment is 
further reduced by room and extraction through the fume 
hood.
c) ZnO fumes potentially resulting in 'Metal fume fever' (see 
explanatory material) are not generated as the operating 
temperature of 450 °C is too low.
5. Tipping over o f the 
vessel (i.e. unstable, 
for example, top 
heavy installation).
Leakage of molten 
metal.
Burns.
Fire.
System is designed such that tipping it over is unlikely. 
Flammable materials are not stored in laboratory for the duration 
of the experiment.
PPE suitable for molten zinc is worn. 
Fire extinguishers are provided. 
Access to laboratory is limited to 
authorised personnel only.
6. Slip /  trip. Floor surfaces.
Spilled fluids (i.e. water, 
oil).
Inadequate lighting.
Ensure that:
a) Trip conditions do not exist.
b) Floor is clean /  dry.
c) Openings are covered or guarded.
d) Adequate lighting is provided.
The containment bund can take the 
entire amount of the molten metal 
(150% of amount).
7. Movement o f 
components or of 
machinery.
Collapsing of parts or 
equipment or materials.
Such activities are prohibited for the duration of the experiment. A fire watch is provided (two man 
experiment).
Access to laboratory is limited to 
authorised personnel only.
8. Thermal radiation or 
other phenomena 
(exposure or ignition 
by naked flames 
(i.e. natural gas 
burners)).
Heat from burners.
Fire (ignition of 
combustible materials).
Protect laboratory furniture closest to the experiment with 
aluminium foil.
Protect Linoleum floor from radiation heat with aluminium foil if 
necessary.
Flammable materials are not stored in the laboratory for the 
duration of the experiment. Ensure this is the case before 
proceeding with the experiment.
A fire watch is provided (two man 
experiment).
Fire extinguishers are provided.
PPS suitable for molten zinc and 
thermal radiation is provided.
Shutdown procedure experiment no. 7
a) remove heat source, i.e. switch off natural gas supply;
b) place flange onto leg A;
c) wait until experiment has cooled down to ambient temperature.
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Experiment 2: Rubber pyrolysis risk assessment
With the steel separation experiments concluded, the 
experiment will be cooled down to ambient and rubber pieces 
obtained from a waste tyre will be loaded into leg A (see Figure 
2). Leg A will be made airtight by bolting down the flange 
(Figure 2, 44). A pressure test (leak test) will be carried out by 
covering all connections with soap solution. The entire system 
will be nitrogen swept for ten minutes to ensure an oxygen 
free environment before the burners are switched on. For the 
remainder of the experiment the chamber will be continuously 
swept with nitrogen. The cooling water to the condenser
(Figure 2,12) will be switched on and a beaker (Figure 2, 43) 
will be used to collect the condensables. The beaker (Figure 2, 
43) will be placed in a laboratory fume hood designed to limit 
exposure to hazardous or toxic fumes. The non-condensables 
including the nitrogen sweep will also be vented into this fume 
hood and extracted to the atmosphere.
In the following table, the additional hazards of the laboratory 
scale pyrolysis plant due to the presence of the pyrolysis gases 
and carbon black from the decomposition of the waste tyre 
rubber are risk assessed.
No Hazard Consequence Preventive measures Mitigation measures
1. Explosive atmosphere inside 
leg A.
The European Standard 
EN 1127-119 distinguishes 
thirteen types o f ignition 
sources. O f these possible 
ignition sources, hot surfaces 
cannot be avoided as they are 
inherent to the experiment 
operating at 450 QC. Hence, 
it is important to maintain an 
inerted state in leg A during 
the experiment as otherwise 
ignition o f the hydrocarbons 
within the chamber may occur.
Explosion 
inside leg A.
Pressure 
increase in leg 
A. Possible 
overflow of 
molten metal 
from leg B. 
Higher than 
normal flow of 
gases through 
vent line into 
fume hood.
Nitrogen inertion to prevent explosive atmosphere 
from forming by:
Chamber leg A is initially nitrogen inerted by 
sweeping it with nitrogen for 10 minutes prior to 
starting the experiments involving rubber. The flow 
of nitrogen to the chamber is monitored by the 
flowmeter.
Furthermore, throughout the experiment the 
chamber leg A is continuously swept with nitrogen, 
the flow of which is monitored by the flowmeter. 
The nitrogen flow to the chamber leg A is visually 
indicated by a flowmeter.
Pyrolysis gases are present for a short time (< 1 
hour) only reducing the time frame of possible 
ignition.
The vessel is designed to take the force of an 
internal vapour explosion without rupture. The 
maximum explosion pressure of a hydrocarbon -  
air explosion is 10 bar20, but the design pressure 
of the chamber is, according to the manufacturer, 
in the order of 3,000 psigor200 barg and is hence 
capable to take the force of an internal explosion 
without damage (explosion pressure resistant).
The tube and valves are designed to at least 33 bar 
at the operating temperature20; again significantly 
higher than the maximum possible explosion 
pressure.
The containment bund can take the entire amount 
of the molten metal, but in the event not all the 
molten metal will be flowing out.
2. Fumes (pyrolysis gases) 
outside o f chamber i.e. due 
to leak.
Fire.
Smell.
Chamber A will be closed with a schedule 40 flange 
and a carbon gasket (suitable up to 500 °C) will be 
fitted, so that fumes cannot escape from leg A.
A fire watch is provided (two man experiment). 
The experiment will be stopped should there be 
excessive smell and fumes visible.
3. Ignition o f hydrocarbon 
vapours at vent outlet.
Fire. The pyrolysis gases are vented into the fume hood 
and are diluted with air.
No ignition sources are present in the fume hood 
and its exhaust system.
The chamber (leg A) and the vent pipe are nitrogen 
inerted.
Moreover pyrolysis gases are present for a short 
time (< 1 hour) only reducing the time frame of 
possible ignition.
A fire watch is provided (two man experiment). 
The collected pyrolysis liquid is unlikely to be 
highly flammable6 being similar to diesel.
Moreover not more than 100 ml are expected to 
be collected. In addition the oil is collected in a 
beaker, which is placed in a laboratory fume hood.
4. Hazards o f nitrogen. Asphyxia. Only a small flow of nitrogen is used and the 
nitrogen flow is measured by a flowmeter.
Good ventilation is provided in the laboratory.
The nitrogen is vented into the fume hood extract 
system and discharged to a safe location.
Leg A and the entire venting system are airtight. 
The operating pressure is low, minimising leakage 
rates.
A fire watch is provided (two man experiment).
5. Carbon black /  pyrolysis gas 
hybrid mixture or carbon 
black atone may be flammable 
at higher temperatures 
(operating temperature is 
450 eC )22.
Fire /  
explosion.
Nitrogen inertion of leg A.
Leg A is airtight and leak tested.
Leg A will only be opened after experiment has 
cooled to ambient.
Provide flow of nitrogen during cool down period to 
avoid air from entering leg A of vessel.
The vessel is designed to take the maximum 
explosion pressure of 10 barg (see above).
The maximum explosion pressure of a carbon 
black /  hydrocarbon hybrid mixture is about 
8-9 bar22 and is hence lower than the maximum 
explosion pressure of a hydrocarbon explosion 
(see above).
6. Increased pressure in leg A 
o f vessel, i.e. due to a closed 
valve.
Overflow of 
molten metal 
from leg B.
Ensure that all valves are in the correct position 
before applying heat.
The containment bund can take the entire amount 
of the molten metal. However, not all the molten 
metal will be flowing out.
Shutdown procedure experiment no. 2
Normal shutdown: a) remove heat source i.e. switch off natural gas supply;
b) switch off water to heat exchanger;
c) wait until experiment has cooled down to ambient temperature;
d) switch off nitrogen sweep through chamber leg A.
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Figure 3. P&ID o f the laboratory scale tyre 
pyrolysis plant as originally planned before 
applying the risk assessment.
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In Table 3 below the consequences and preventive measures /  actions of utility losses are assessed.
No Utility loss Consequence Preventive measures /  actions
7. Loss o f nitrogen. Similar to ‘explosive atmosphere in leg A' (see above). Ensure a sufficient amount of nitrogen is available before 
commencing pyrolysis experiments. Loss o f nitrogen will be 
manually detected by monitoring the flowmeter. Experiment will be 
stopped and all valves closed should the nitrogen flow fail.
2. Loss o f natural gas. Loss of heat, no safety implications. The experiment will be stopped /  disrupted i.e. chamber will cool 
down.
If the experiment involves rubber, the nitrogen sweep through the 
chamber will continue until the experiment has cooled down to 
ambient, preventing air from entering the chamber.
3. Loss o f cooling 
water.
Loss of cooling to condenser would result in an increase of 
pyrolysis gases being discharged. It may also result in a loss 
o f the water seal due to excessive evaporation and as a result 
the slight overpressure towards the atmosphere in leg A 
might be lost.
Loss of cooling water can be detected visually by routing the cooling 
water return locally into a sink.
The amount of rubber in the experiment is limited; hence the 
amount of pyrolysis gas is also limited.
The experiment will be stopped i.e. chamber will be cooled down as 
described above.
4. Loss o f electricity. The experiment does not require electricity, but the room 
itself may be dark. Loss of extract from fume hood.
The experiment will be stopped /  disrupted. The flow of natural gas 
to the experiment will be stopped by the operator before leaving the 
lab. All valves will be closed sealing in the pyrolysis gases. 
Emergency lights are provided in the laboratory.
5. Loss o f extraction. Pyrolysis gases may enter the room. Smell in laboratory. Ensure the extract system is in good working order before 
commencing experiment. The experiment will be stopped as stated 
above should the fume hood fail. The fume hood is alarmed for 
failure o f extraction.
General safeguards
At the door to the laboratory, the following warnings shall be 
displayed:
a) high temperature experiment;
b) admittance of non-authorised persons is prohibited.
During the experiments, PPE suitable for molten zinc shall 
be worn:
a) face protection, gloves, trousers and jacket constructed of 
self-extinguishing material suitable for molten zinc.
b) safety shoes with a friction/slip resistant sole as used in the 
chemical industry.
PPE should not be the primary line of defence against 
accidents13'14 and it is not intended to be the case here. The 
decision to wear suitable PPE was made as residual risks remain 
and this experiment is executed for the first time.
The following equipment is available at the location to mitigate 
against an accident:
a) fire fighting equipment;
b) eye wash station /  emergency shower;
c) first aid equipment.
Summary of risk assessment outcome
The risk of a major accident, i.e. afire or injury, is negligible 
as all reasonable hazards have been identified and preventive 
measures have been taken. In addition, mitigation measures 
have been identified and put into place, reducing the 
consequences of an accident.
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Appendix: Additional explanatory material
Zinc melts at a temperature of 419 SC and has the following 
properties in its molten state:
Compound Density
[kg/m 3]
Surface
tension
[N /m ]
Viscosity
[Pas]
Melting
point
DC]
Vapour
pressure
[Pa]
Zinc
(molten)
6,508 at 
476 aC
0.755 at 
450 eC
0.003254 
at 476 SC
419 100 
at 477 
fiC
Water (25 
SC)
1,000 0.072 0.001003 0 3,000
Table 4: Physical properties o f molten zinc23'24 in comparison 
to water24
Inhaling zinc oxide may result in 'metal fume fever'25:
Metal fume fever is the symptom of acute ZnO poisoning. 
Symptoms generally appear within a few hours after acute 
exposure, usually with dryness of the throat and coughing, 
and generally resolve within 1 -4 days after cessation of 
exposure without leading to long-term respiratory effects.
Exposure levels leading to the development of metal fume 
fever have been characterised. While the precursor events 
for the development of metal fume fever begin to occur at 
very low zinc concentrations, the condition itself does not 
fully manifest until exposure levels reach much higher (>75 
mg/m3) levels.
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